After the Great Moderation
As the 20th century ended, a reappraisal began of the 1970s as a crucial turning point in modernity. For some historians the 1970s were marked as the moment "after the boom"
1 . For others the epoch was defined by the "Shock of the Global" the relationship between capitalism, fiat money and democratic policy-making. This question acquired an additional edge and urgency because the move to floating fiat currencies coincided with something else unprecedented, a sharp acceleration of inflation in peacetime. The datasets routinely used in economic research at the time immediately conveyed a sense of the historical significance of the event 6 . In two centuries of modern economic history, the inflations that set in during the early 1970s were the worst ever experienced outside wartime or postwar conditions.
The only comparison was the monetary instability that wracked Latin America from the 1950s.
In some ways the crisis of capitalist governance in the West was a mirror image of that afflicting the ailing regimes of the Soviet bloc unprecedented emergency actions. We have escaped the nightmare of a return to the deflationary 1930s. But the complacency of the Great Moderation narrative has been broken beyond repair.
The history of the 1970s inflation and disinflation was never as simple as it appeared in narratives designed to legitimate currency policy. In light of recent events we conclude that it is time to revisit the history of the Great Inflation -both the events of the epoch and the stories told about them -and to pose the question put to modernity by Alexander Kluge. Was the refoundation of democratic capitalism through the overcoming of inflation a learning process with a fatal outcome? 9
Remapping Democratic Capitalism
Already as it happened, as prices and wages surged from the late 1960s onwards, inflation became the object for wide-ranging investigations by several cross-disciplinary collaborations between economists, political scientists, and historians. These ranged from the Trilateral Com- "The big issue [within the Tory party in the early 1970s] was the means to control inflation and I think that is often underestimated today. There was a real belief in this country and in America, […] that in order to control inflation you had to control the price of bread, you had to have price controls and wage controls and the idea that you could control inflation by interest rates and the money supply, to some people, just appeared unbelievable and I think that was the big early battle.
[…] There were fierce arguments in the Conservative Party and among Members of Parliament and the then Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who refused to acknowledge that this was remotely relevant, the money supply. We were just told […] you know, don't be so simplistic."
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As opposed to the one-dimensional formula of the monetarists, the 1970s produced an efflorescence of structuralist and historically-minded accounts of the political economy of inflation, along with policies to match. The young Charles Maier, fresh from his research into the political economy of the interwar period, was particularly active in giving historical depth to the inflation story. When, as the language of the McCracken report had it, "unfortunate disturbances"
"bunched" to the degree that they had in the 1970s, Maier argued, broader "systemic" factors and "institutional structures" were at work What was at stake in the debates between left and right structuralists were attitudes towards the "mixed economies" of the postwar period. For the right, the 1970s marked the point at which the slippery slope had taken on a dangerous incline. As Buchanan and Wagner put it, inflation was associated with a "generalized erosion in public and private manners, increasingly liberalized attitudes toward sexual activities, a declining vitality of the Puritan work ethic, deterioration in product quality, explosion of the welfare rolls, widespread corruption" economic actors would have to be modeled as anticipating and reacting to policy, a feedback loop that destabilized the structural models on which policy was supposed to be based. Unless a rigid policy rule was adopted, the outcome was unpredictable. A year later Kydland and Prescott went on to drive home the case for a rule-bound policy but also brought out the tragic paradox this involved 25 . Having adopted a specific rule and encouraged society to believe in it, policy-makers would face a gigantic temptation to exploit that fact and to engage in rule-breaking discretionary policy. The results, though the policy-maker might achieve short-term improvements, would be suboptimal in the long run. The only way to minimize this problem of time inconsistency and to avoid "excessive inflation" was for stringent monetary and fiscal rules to remove policy entirely from the political process, placing it in the hands of independent central bankers, who were committed as publicly as possible to the most stringent targets 26 . In 1977 that seemed like whistling in the dark.
Governing at a Distance
With hindsight what is most striking about contemporary analyses of inflation dating to the 1970s, whether they be accidentalist à la OECD, left-structuralist or right-structuralist, is their failure to anticipate the scale of the transformation that lay ahead. We tend to forget how miraculous our current situation of democracies across the developed world, binding themselves to policies of low inflation and fiscal austerity would have appeared to most observers in the 1970s.
Writing in the mid 1970s Goldthorpe was convinced that the right-wing anti-inflation hawks were doomed to disappointment. No "responsible" politician would risk anti-inflationary policies that put the "legitimacy of government" at stake in "head-on and powerful" confrontations with major interest groups, he opined The class-conflict model suggests that inflation was a populist path of least resistance. But opinion poll evidence from across the developed world in the 1970s challenges this familiar picture of escapist inflationary politics. Far from viewing inflation as a lesser evil, the popular imagination was ruled from the early 1970s by a concern for inflation bordering on fear. est rates that could not be sustained as inflation accelerated. By the 1970s in the US nothing less than the functioning of the entire housing market was at stake. Likewise, inflation impacted the vast majority of the population through taxes. In the wake of World War II the tax state had become an intrusive presence in the budgets of all but the poorest households. The effect of inflation was to drive painful "bracket creep"
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. Meanwhile, less well-off households on benefits had to fear that their payments would not be adjusted 40 .
In theory one could imagine a perfectly indexed social and economic system that would be indifferent to inflation. In practice there was very good reason for tens of millions across the developed world to prefer a world in which prices were stable. The networks of dependence and obligation that underpinned the stability coalition were subtle and can appear slight in relation to the massive social forces -capital, labour, etc. -invoked by simpler class-based analysis. Money is a social medium. Like other media, such as language, law, perhaps even politics itself, it defies explanation in crude interest group terms. But this does not mean that it is inconsequential or that we have no interest in it. The disruptions to the monetary system unleashed by the Great Inflation of the 1970s had all pervasive effects and provided the raw material out of which a variety of election-winning anti-inflation coalitions could be and were built.
Contrary to what would be predicted by both left-and right-structuralists, there is little evidence that policy-makers in the 1970s ever took the inflation problem anything other than extremely seriously. Evidence of inflationary escapism or "money illusion" is far less common than one would expect. Given the wall of public hostility to inflation, to prioritize stimulus over price stability as was attempted by several countries in the early 1970s was itself a high-risk political strategy. It could be justified not in terms of a short-term boost to employment, but only as part of a "dash for growth", a deliberately unbalanced strategy aiming to restore the vitality of national economic development As Greta Krippner has pointed out in her path-breaking study of financialization in the US, the effect of the 1970s inflation was not to relieve politics of critical decisions, but to accelerate the pace and breadth of politicization of prices, wages, fees, taxes and interest rates, all of which had to be inflation-adjusted 45 . If there was a legitimation crisis in the 1970s, then inflation, rather than serving as a safety valve, or a politically cheap means of "buying time", almost immediately began to be viewed as both a symptom and an exacerbating cause of delegitimization. As recent intellectual histories of the new right have shown, the main attraction 42 of the monetarist agenda was not that it promised a more direct and aggressive assault on inflation 46 . Wage and price controls could hardly be bettered in terms of directness. By contrast, monetarism was widely regarded even by many conservatives as a risky, hands off alternative.
Because they attacked the problem only indirectly by way of the money supply, the monetarists were dubbed the "chiropractors of modern economics"
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. The real charm of monetarist antiinflation politics was precisely that by "governing at a distance" they promised a means of depoliticizing the economy and of restoring the economy as a "neutral" non-political realm, relieving the enormous burden of legitimization that the more interventionist policies of the 1970s had imposed on the political system Given the very real force of counter-inflation interests in society, the fact that anti-inflation politics came to fore is not by itself surprising. If it was undeniably true that Reagan and Thatcher accepted rising unemployment as the price of combating inflation, it is hardly the case that this involved them in hair-raising political risks. As mentioned above, the opinion poll evidence from the time suggests the opposite. Given the pronounced strength of the anti-inflation majority and The aim of our anti-heroic narrative of disinflation is not, however, simply to suggest a revision of familiar view of the Thatcher and Reagan "revolutions". The aim is to revise our understanding of the problem of democracy in relation to economic policy. Left-and right-structuralists postulate a conflict between democracy and capitalism, which, on the left reading, must either lead to terminal crisis, or in the right-structuralist version must be overcome by depoliticization. That is the moral drawn from the history of inflation in the 1970s and the 1980s. Inflation was a political and economic time bomb that had to be defused as urgently as possible. A critique of both positions by way of a new history of the struggle over inflation in 1970s, would, by contrast, seek to disarm this rhetoric of emergency and necessity. What we must insist upon is that under conditions of a fiat money regime, the choice of deflation or inflation is open. The problem is not that of a lethal and urgent menace to the common good. It is that of a political choice with distributional consequences. The historical question is how that openness became foreclosed and how the history of that closure has been told. Depicting the history of the 1970s as a choice between a populist and delusionary "sell out" to inflation, and the virtue and realism of disinflation, is the beginning of that closure.
The Politics of Disinflation
Once we remove the blinders of the conventional narrative of the "conquest of inflation", what is remarkable is how complex, historically contingent and politically multivalent the emerging anti-inflation coalitions of the 1970s were. Even in Germany, so often cited as the prime example of steadfast anti-inflation politics, the course was far from predetermined. The exchange rate peg to the DM was reinforced so as to force French industry into streamlining and pressure the trade unions into wage restraint. Meanwhile, the government publicly announced a money supply target and sought to manipulate the allocation of credit within the framework known as the encadrement du crédit. The aim was disinflation, the analytic framework was monetarist, but the means employed were extensively interventionist, providing "Nearly 40 years ago, when the world watched to see whether his nation would survive, Winston Churchill defied those who thought Britain would fall to the Nazi threat. Churchill replied by asking his countrymen, 'What kind of people do they think we are?' There are those today who say that a free economy cannot cope with inflation and that we've lost our ability to act as a nation rather than as a collection of special interests. And I reply, 'What kind of people do they think we are?' I believe that our people, our economic system, and our government are equal to this task. I hope that you will prove me right." 57 This was not democracy speaking the language of appeasement, "buying time", or indulging in inflationary escapism. This was the language of Dunkirk and of "blood, toil, tears and sweat". 
The Turn
It was between 1979 and 1986 that the politics of inflation and anti-inflation took on the resolutely conservative, free-market, anti-labour character that would later be naturalized in the heroic narrative of Thatcher and Reagan. This cannot be understood except in an international context. In the great disinflation of the early 1980s international power and influence were crucial factors. The politics of money was directly linked to the rallying of "the West" in the final confrontation of the Cold War. There was of course an evident economic rationale for the EMS from the German point of view. The currency system would slow the depreciation of the European currencies against the DM. But there was far more at stake for Schmidt than a mercantilist exercise in export promotion. This became evident in 1978 when the EMS proposal was put to the Bundesbank. For the Bundesbankers, the EMS was a mixed blessing. It implied a considerable constraint on the autonomy they had struggled to establish since the end of Bretton Woods. Any fixed exchange rate regime would limit their ability to set national monetary policy. And a currency pact with the 
Captive Closure and Modernity
It is of course important to acknowledge one's location. We think, whether we admit it or not, from within traditions. But for those filiations not to become rigid ideological shackles it is important to reexamine the past that shapes us. Rather than expecting the present endlessly to repeat the "lessons learned" in the 1970s, we would surely be better occupied asking how the history of the Great Inflation, which as we have shown here was always already contentious, appears in new light given the upheaval of the Financial Crisis. If we view the relationship between present and past not as static repetition, but with a view to dynamic mutual reinterpretation, three fundamental revisions force themselves immediately on our attention.
Rather than seeing the 1970s as the staging ground for the Great Moderation, it now seems that the transition from the inflationary 1970s to the 1980s set the stage for destabilizing financialization, a huge surge in inequality, and a form of globalization that threatens not just disinflation, but a new era of long-run deflation. 
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In August 2011 Krugman was touting the idea of a war against Martians; www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/15/paul-krugman-fake-alien-invasion_n_926995.html. In February 2012 he gave a notorious interview to Playboy in which he stated that "Chinese policy right now is our enemy"; www.workinglife.org/jonathantasinis-columns/playboy-interview-with-paul-krugman.
